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I devoted a great deal of my teaching energy during the last ten years of 
my tenure at the University of Minnesota Law School to a course I called 
the Sentencing Workshop. The Workshop provided a unique opportunity for 
law students and judges to learn from each other about the intricacies, the 
successes and failures of the American criminal justice sentencing structure 
and practice. I will describe it in three phases: initially, to give some context, I 
will report a dramatic Workshop discussion which occurred the fifth or sixth 
year the course was offered. A short summary of the program’s mechanics 
follows, followed by an anecdotal and analytic picture of the Workshop’s 
pursuit of its several educational missions.
I
There were 27 people sitting around a large oblong of conference tables. It 
was an unusual law school class: eight trial judges, four from South Carolina, 
four from Oklahoma, and 13 students. The teaching “team” included the 
Minnesota public defender, a well-known local corrections consultant, and a 
former prosecutor now in private practice.
1. This paper is the written version, with a few stylistic amendments and corrections and 
with some but not all footnotes updated, of a public lecture delivered at the University of 
Minnesota Law School on Oct. 11, 1996, on the occasion of the presentation to me of the 
William L. Prosser Chair in Law. The Workshop was offered at Minnesota for 15 years, 
until my retirement in 2001. Eventually, seven other law schools added the program to their 
curricula more or less as it is described here. The program would not have been possible had 
the late Dan Freed, an enormously talented and innovative teacher, not been willing to share 
with me the method he devised for combining educational opportunities for law students 
with continuing education for judges. For my own continuing interest in the sentencing 
of criminals, I am indebted to the late Caleb Foote, my long-time friend, co-author and 
severest critic, who introduced me to the pains and pleasures of criminal law as an academic 
endeavor, and whose decency, fine intelligence, and sense of moral outrage about unfair and 
undue punishment of criminals I have tried to emulate. See Robert J. Levy, Caleb Foote: A 
Personal and Loving Remembrance, 12 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 127 (2007). 
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Each participant had received a large “casebook” consisting of the available 
file material (excluding the actual sentence) for at least one defendant 
sentenced by each of the judges. Each participant had read the files, each (other 
than the actual sentencer of a particular defendant) had sentenced each of 
the defendants and had written an “opinion” explaining the sentence. A “box 
score,” a short summary of all participant sentences, had been prepared by the 
students; and the box scores, the sentences and accompanying memoranda, a 
169-page package, had been sent to each participant. As they sat around the 
table that morning, then, all participants were fairly familiar with each case 
and with other participant’s sentences and reasoning.
The participants had met once before, five weeks earlier, and discussed a 
separate group of cases. The first weekend, like this one, began on Thursday 
evening with dinner, lasted until Sunday morning and included almost 
constant social and intellectual interchange. In short, each participant had 
already learned a considerable amount about the others’ backgrounds, 
experience and attitudes about sentencing and corrections.
I expected that the Crocker case,2 from South Carolina, would stimulate 
controversy. The 30-year-old defendant had pleaded guilty to four counts of 
burglary.3 The defendant’s house break-ins were, to say the least, unusual—
they appeared to have been committed to permit him to fondle the feet of 
inhabitants while they slept. Because of his behavior, Crocker was quickly 
shifted from jail to the forensic unit of the state hospital.4 The defendant 
was found to be sane, but suffering from “major depression with psychotic 
features,” an “obsessive compulsive disorder and paraphilia . . . and sexual 
sadism.” He presented “evidence of recurrent obsessions about negative 
events happening to his family members,” neutralized by “spitting in his 
bed at nighttime repeatedly,” “a sexual preoccupation with feet,” and “other 
sexual fantasies that are more sadistic in nature.”5 While hospitalized for an 
appendectomy, Crocker had been discovered in the hospital morgue feeling the 
feet of a corpse. During his state hospital stay, Crocker’s depression as well as 
his psychosis improved; but, “despite high doses of appropriate medications,” 
the obsessive compulsive disorder did not improve. The doctors concluded 
that Crocker required specialized treatment for his sexual sadism—treatment 
available only at a private hospital in Atlanta, Georgia. The doctor informed 
the trial judge that if the defendant “did not receive treatment he would either 
2. Needless to say, the defendant’s name has been changed to protect his privacy.
3. As is true of procedural and substantive issues in other cases described in this essay, some 
of the Crocker charges have been simplified and others eliminated. Crocker, for example, 
was actually charged with one count of first degree burglary (with violence), three counts of 
second degree burglary, and two counts of driving with a suspended license. He pleaded to 
the two driving counts and four counts of second degree burglary. In addition, to save space, 
some medical diagnoses have been shortened and simplified.
4. His jail cellmate promptly committed suicide—only one of the many mysteries of this case.
5. On one occasion, Crocker had attempted to order a tear gas gun to help subdue a victim, 
but had not actually acquired the weapon and had never otherwise acted on his fantasies.
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be killed, commit suicide, or kill someone”—but that the cure rate “would be 
about eighty-five percent, if he completed his counseling.”
The “box score” for the Crocker case showed great differences among 
Workshop sentencers. All but one of the judges chose an incarcerative sentence, 
varying from an unspecified period to 35 years. The student sentences were as 
varied: one student recommended a form of fine; their incarcerative sentences 
ranged from one to ten years.
Workshop discussions usually began by resolving the case’s factual 
ambiguities. The sentencing judge stated that the Georgia treatment facility 
was not a realistic alternative because no post-hospitalization control of the 
defendant could have been maintained. But he admitted that the defendant’s 
sentence could have been suspended on condition that he be returned to 
the court for sentencing at the end of the hospital’s treatment. The judge 
also disclosed that the defendant’s family had agreed to pay the cost of 
hospitalization in Georgia. The former prosecutor suggested that sending this 
defendant to prison was in fact a death sentence. Then, when asked directly, 
the sentencing judge disclosed that he had sentenced Crocker to 16 years in 
prison.
I saw, or thought I saw, the judge give a small, tight smile. Oppressed by 
my vision of this unfortunate defendant and his problematic future, angry 
that a sentencer might be pleased with himself for imposing under-the-table 
capital punishment, I was ready for a confrontation. Yet I let the opportunity 
pass. Had I really seen a smile? Or just one more of those many masks judges 
wear—this one to disguise his discomfort with the need to fulfill his civic 
responsibility at such awful personal cost to a hapless criminal? If I was wrong, 
I’d cause a row and might do some harm. Or was I afraid to pick a fight? 
The dramatic quality of the case, the emotional intensity of the discussion, led 
some of us irresistibly to such personal questions—and others to more abstract 
professional introspection.
We spoke no more about the Crocker case—but we learned many and varied 
lessons that day—lessons about criminals and their pasts and futures, about 
judges and their values and methods, about law and life. I won’t try to recount 
those lessons; rather, I will focus on the Workshop’s methods of inducing and 
facilitating them.
I cannot do justice to the Minnesota Sentencing Workshop without pausing 
to outline the desperately serious social and legal problem that drives it—our 
impoverished correctional system and its overcrowded prisons. Consider a few 
randomly chosen facts. Although the crime rate has remained fairly stable in 
recent years, the number of prisoners, state and federal, doubled between 1980 
and 1990: In 1980 there were 23,779 federal prisoners; in 1994 there 95,034.6 
6. See U.S. Department of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (1995) [hereinafter 
Sourcebook]. In 1980, there were 23,779 federal and 295,819 state prisoners; in 1990 there 
were 58,838 federal and 684,544 state prisoners. Id. at 548 tbl. 6, 11. In 2009, the comparable 
figures were 208,118 federal and 1,405,622 state prisoners. Most of the obviously dated 
statistics in the text have been retained so that readers can know the scope of the problem 
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At the end of 1994, there were more than 1.4 million persons incarcerated in 
prisons and local jails and at least 29 state and federal government prison 
systems were operating at above their rated capacities.7 In 1995, California had 
134,718 prisoners in facilities designed for 77,884; the prediction at that time 
was that by 2000 there would be 214,963 prisoners.8 Meanwhile, California 
state spending for prison administration was 9 percent of the state budget 
in 1994, but was predicted to increase to 18 percent by 2002.9 In 1994, the 
incarceration rate for African-Americans was seven times the rate for white 
defendants.10 In 1980, drug offenses accounted for 19,000 state prisoners; in 
1993 they accounted for 186,000.11 American sentences are out of all proportion 
to sentences for similar crimes in the Western Europe countries to which we 
as of the time this speech was delivered and decide for themselves whether the problem is 
larger or smaller today.
7. Id. See also http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011justification/pd/fy11-bop-se-justification.pdf 
(“BOPfacilities are very crowded—36 percent above rated capacity system-wide as of January 
21, 2010. Over 171,000 of the current federal inmate population are in facilities operated by 
the BOP, which are intended to house only about 125,811”).
8. See Sourcebook, supra note 6. When a federal lawsuit was filed in 2001 complaining that 
overcrowded prison conditions in California violated rights of prisoners, the prison 
population was approximately 156,000 in facilities designed to house a population of just 
under 80,000. A three judge federal district court held that these conditions violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment and ordered the state to reduce the prison population to 137.5 
percent of design capacity. The three judge court order was affirmed by a divided Supreme 
Court in Brown v. Plata, 131 Sup. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
9. Peter W. Greenwood, et al., Rand Research Review: Focus on Crime and Drug Policy, 
Three Strikes, Serious Flaws and a Huge Price Tag 2 (RAND Corp. 1995). 
10. For a contemporaneous account of the continuing racial disparities in American criminal 
justice administration, described as “rife with inequality,” see William J. Stuntz, Unequal 
Justice, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1970, 1971 (2008) (“African Americans constitute 13 [percent] of the 
general population, but nearly half of a record-high prison population. The imprisonment 
rate for Latino males is almost triple the rate for white males; black men are locked up at 
nearly seven times the rate of their white counterparts. The differentials in drug punishment 
are even larger: of every 100,000 black Americans, 350 are imprisoned on drug charges; the 
analogous figure for whites is 28.”) (Citations omitted).
11. See also E. Blumenson & E. Nilson, No Rational Basis: The Pragmatic Case for Marijuana 
Law Reform, 17 Va. J. Social Prob. & the Law, 43, 48, 59 n.64, 65 (2009) (Approximately 25 
million Americans used marijuana during 2008; in 2001, 4,000 defendants received federal 
prison sentences for marijuana offenses and approximately 11,000 received state sentences; 
in 2006, 43.9 percent of the almost two million arrests for drug abuse violations were for 
marijuana.). 
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turn in making quality of life comparisons.12 And there is much, much more.13 
In short, by almost any measure, American incarceration policies unduly 
strain our financial and human resources and may well be placing too heavy a 
burden on us and on the next generation.14
12. See Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Reform, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. 
Roundtable 391 (1995). Comparisons to other countries take no account of the occasional 
absurdly lengthy sentences imposed in some states—such as the Oklahoma case in which a 
jury sentenced the defendant to a 10,002 year consecutive sentence. Bill Braun, Jury Gives 
Rapist 10,002 Years, [Tulsa] Trib. & World, Apr. 18, 1996, at A9. Lengthy sentences in federal 
prosecutions for child sexual abuse are regularly approved in federal Courts of Appeal. See, 
e.g., United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (trial judge’s 17 year prison sentence 
reversed; trial judge instructed on remand to impose proper sentence of 30 years in prison); 
United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (defendant more than 80 years old 
sentenced to 20 years); United States v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2008) (73 year old 
defendant sentenced to prison for 20 years). 
13. See also United States v. Dyce, 78 F.3d 610, 616 (D.D.C. 1996). First time offender, single 
occasion drug courier given five year sentence because her “family circumstances” were not 
deemed “extraordinary” within the meaning of a federal sentencing guidelines criterion 
for downward departure from guideline, despite the fact that defendant had two young 
children and a baby she was breast feeding, since older children could be cared for by other 
adults in the family and sentence could be postponed until after the baby was weaned. A 
member of the appellate panel commented: “The unfortunate fact is that some mothers are 
criminals, and, like it or not, incarceration is our criminal justice system’s principal method 
of punishment. . . . A term in jail will always separate a mother from her children.” Id. at 617 
(concurring opinion).
14. When this speech was given, as is the case today, academic as well as popular literature 
was full of criticism of state and federal legislative and judicial sentencing policies 
(and, of course, the consequent overcrowding of state and federal prisons). For a recent 
illustration, see D. Cole, Can Our Shameful Prisons be Reformed?, N.Y. Rev. Books 41 
(Nov. 19, 2009). See also Randal C. Archibold, Driven to Fiscal Brink, State Opens Prison 
Doors, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 2010. A very significant segment of the academic community 
interested in reform supported and continues to support (despite what some see as an effort 
by the U.S. Supreme Court to undermine it) the “Sentencing Guidelines” movement, 
begun in a few states and given enormous weight by its adoption by the U.S. Congress. 
The movement was undergirded by widespread opposition to individual judges’ extreme 
variation (and more than occasional harshness) in exercising their sentencing discretion. 
For early and biting criticism of the federal guidelines, see Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: 
The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 85 (2005). 
For a fair history of the Guidelines “movement,” an accurate account of the vast literature 
produced by advocates and opponents, a description of the dismantling of the federal 
guidelines by the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as a thoughtful and objective analysis of the 
sentencing problem and support for a carefully limited guidelines approach to sentencing, 
see Robert Weisberg, How Sentencing Commissions Turned Out To Be a Good Idea, 12 
Berkeley J. Crim. Law 179 (2007). See also Kevin Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: 
Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1082 (2005); Kevin 
Reitz, Modeling Discretion in American Sentencing Systems, 20 Law & Pol’y 389 (1998). 
(Professor Reitz was the reporter for the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code: 
Sentencing, Plan for Revision, an effort which adopted a kind of guidelines system, but 
much less complex than the federal one.) Although I suspect that most guidelines advocates 
would disagree, I believe the Workshop program is consistent with any guidelines system 
that contemplates a sufficient number of broad, discretionary “downward departure” 
categories—of a kind that would permit trial judges to “depart” substantially (e.g., deviate, 
almost always, to a lower period of incarceration) from the legislatively or sentencing 
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Let me say something about the Workshop goals. Sitting across from me 
in a restaurant after two full days of the first Workshop session, one of the 
Oklahoma judges—an infrequent talker, apparently a little skeptical about the 
discussions, and a stern sentencer—asked me quizzically: “What’s the ‘real’ 
agenda here?”15 “Whose agenda?” I responded, “The Edna McConnell Clark 
Foundation’s, the law school’s or mine?” The Foundation wanted influential 
judges to understand the costs and dangers of overcrowded prisons and the 
virtues of what is often called alternative punishment, hoped the judges 
would be influenced to make greater use of nonincarcerative sentences and 
would persuade their colleagues and communities that prisons are precious 
correctional resources to be used only where necessary but certainly less 
frequently than they were currently being used. The law school’s agenda 
was quite different since it is in the business of educating law students. With 
financial help from the Foundation, the law school believed that students would 
learn more about criminal law from the Workshop than we could squeeze into 
courses with more credit hours; and students would also be educated about 
judging, relations between lawyers and judges, and about professionalism. My 
agenda was even broader than the law school’s: in addition to educating law 
students, I wanted judges to have leisure from the time constraints of their 
dockets, from the pressures put on them by prosecutors, defense counsel and 
reporters; I wanted to help them to explore their sentencing methods and, 
with the aid of their colleagues, to decide whether they are satisfied or might 
want to consider changes.
Perhaps I should also have described my personal correctional values. But 
that would have been duplicative—in facilitating the discussions I could not, 
and didn’t try, to hide my own values. The judges knew that I believed our 
prisons and the lengthy sentences imposed by judges are a national disgrace; 
that the extreme length of too many criminal sentences can be explained more 
by politics than by sound policy; and that overcrowded prisons and extremely 
commission determined guideline sentence in cases of the kind described in this essay. Of 
course, supporters of guideline orthodoxy would complain that broad downward departure 
provisions will produce the kind of indeterminacy that in the past has produced great 
sentence variations for similar criminal behavior and harsh sentences imposed by “tough” 
judges. For some indication that, both before and after the U.S. Supreme Court freed 
federal trial judges from the mandatory features of the federal guidelines, not all federal 
judges agreed with their policy underpinnings, see, e.g., Peter Lattman, In Galleon, Prison 
Term Seen as Test, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 2011, at B1. “Judge Rakoff . . . sentenced . . .a 
former health care company executive facing an 85-year sentence under the guidelines, to 
three and a half years in prison. . . . Judge Rakoff wrote that the proposed sentence exposed 
the ‘utter travesty of justice that sometimes results from the guidelines’ fetish with abstract 
arithmetic.’” In another case, Judge Rakoff sentenced a defendant to four years in prison 
when the prosecutor recommended a Guidelines determined sentence of six and a half to 
eight years with the comment that “the guidelines give the mirage of something that can 
be obtained with arithmetic certainty.” Peter Lattman, Defendants Sentenced in Insider 
Trading Case, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2011, at B3.
15. Unless otherwise noted, all participant quotations in this paper are approximate and from 
memory.
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lengthy sentences inhibit the creation and substantial use of alternatives to 
prison for punishing criminal behavior.16 Sentencing guidelines can increase 
uniformity and limit to some extent excessive imprisonment, but we must find 
a way to insure that sanctions will always be “the least restrictive necessary to 
achieve their purposes.”17 Sentencing judges should distinguish professional 
criminals from those who, although they commit crimes, even violent crimes, 
do so for reasons like hunger, poverty, mental illness, brain dysfunction or 
other disability, ignorance, or a craving for drugs or alcohol. I hoped that 
the judge knew and I was sure he would eventually conclude, that I would 
never try to impose what some would consider these radical views on other 
participants in the Workshop.
II
The University of Minnesota sentencing seminar and Workshop was an 
unusual law school curriculum offering; it carried five credits, mixed students 
with judges, prosecutors, defense counsel and correction officials, fed the 
students and took them to such exotic places as Claymore and Paul’s Valley, 
Oklahoma, where they spent time with a judge on the bench and learned 
about another state’s criminal justice system at first hand.
During the first semester we conducted a fairly traditional sentencing 
seminar, addressing theories of punishment, guideline sentencing, day-fine 
experiments, jails, home detention, electronic monitoring, and the like. The 
students also visited a state prison, heard from directors of drug and sex crime 
treatment programs and from those who administer community punishment 
programs of a variety of kinds. By the end of the semester the students 
understood most current sentencing schemes as well as the national crisis 
caused by our incarceration policies.
During the first semester, judges were chosen for the Workshop by state 
officials. Each of the judges provided file materials on six defendants he or she 
had sentenced. The cases were often complex because we specifically asked 
the judges for cases they had found difficult to sentence. The first session’s 
16. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591, 592 
(1996) (describing the theory of “failure of democratic politics” as the “conventional answer” 
to the public’s resistance to alternative sanctions: “Members of the public are ignorant of 
the availability and feasibility of alternative sanctions; as a result, they are easy prey for 
self-interested politicians who exploit their fear of crime by advocating more severe prison 
sentences. The only possible solution, on this analysis, is a relentless effort to educate the 
public on the virtues of the prison’s rivals.”) Id. Professor Kahan claimed that the public’s 
resistance to alternative sanctions is better explained by their failure to satisfy the “expressive 
dimension” of punishment. Id.
17. Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 59-62, 73-76 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1974). 
Morris described the notion as sentencing “parsimony.” Id. at 60. For an analysis of the 
competing meanings of the term, see Richard Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and 
Practice, 22 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 363 (1997). For a recent, and very 
explicit and sarcastic, rejection of the notion of sentencing “parsimony,” see United States v. 
Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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cases were chosen and arranged to assure continuing participant involvement 
and coverage of a wide variety of crimes and defendants’ and situations. They 
also assured at least one opportunity for the judges to show that in particular 
cases and classes of cases students injected their personal values into the 
sentence just as much as they believed judges do. In fact, the students usually 
sentenced defendants accused of rape, sexual abuse of children and vehicular 
homicide much more harshly than they sentenced defendants accused of other 
violent crimes and much more harshly than the judges sentenced these same 
defendants. The second session discussed participants’ sentences of a new set 
of defendants previously sentenced by participating judges.18 
The third session materials differed substantially. Each of the judges was 
initially asked to find a current case in which an unsentenced defendant 
seemed slated for a prison term. When a suitable case involving a substantial 
offense had been selected, a “client-specific planner” was hired. The planner 
investigated the case and resources in the community, and prepared a report 
recommending some kind of punishment. Client-specific planners, specially 
trained and highly skilled criminal corrections experts, prepared presentence 
investigation reports essentially oriented to the defendant’s individual 
background with the goal of punishing without incarceration. Participants 
received files of these cases after they had sentenced the defendants, and then 
having read the client-specific plan, could recommend a different sentence. 
The client-specific planner attended the last session.19 
18. At each session, the core group usually expanded to include a variety of criminal justice 
professionals from states which had adopted sentencing programs or states considering 
whether to adopt one.
19. Client-specific plans differ in a variety of respects from traditional, and frequently 
prosecution oriented, pre-sentence investigations. First and foremost, CSPs are, as indicated 
above, defendant- and non-incarceration oriented, while always making it clear that the 
recommendation is not an effort to allow the defendant to evade punishment for the crime. 
Unlike most probation officers, the planner, typically a trained criminal justice sentencing 
expert (either self-employed or an employee of a private agency), makes use of resources 
in the community generally unknown to corrections professionals that emphasize both 
punishment and rehabilitation—for example, private and/or publicly financed in-patient 
alcohol or mental health treatment facilities. Planners also help connect the defendant 
to the resource before the judge is scheduled to sentence as well as facilitate a mutual 
commitment by both the defendant and the resource to work together—thus increasing the 
likelihood that the judge will accept the recommendation. The planner also looks for and 
usually finds a stable member of the community who knows the defendant and is willing 
to take some responsibility for the punishment and rehabilitation process, thus helping to 
minimize the judge’s fears of allowing the defendant to remain in the community. Even 
if client-specific planners and their plans played no role in persuading Workshop judges 
that non-incarcerative sentences can succeed, they would still be enormously useful; they 
show judges how much help good pre-sentence investigators (PSIs) could provide in 
seeking just and individualized sentences. Showing judges that they should and need not be 
satisfied with the status quo encourages them to seek improvement in their own presentence 
evaluation systems.
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III
The formal Workshop sessions were fun—as good law school classes are 
fun for well-prepared students. We discussed the cases and the individual 
defendants, how fair and just sentencing principles should be applied, 
community understanding and acceptance of judges’ roles, prosecutorial 
discretion and its impact on judges, and judicial authority and its impact on 
prosecutors. The discussions informed participants about these issues and 
about varying approaches to them from state to state. Occasionally, judges 
learned for the first time about correctional resources available in their 
own states.20 The judges were bombarded with interesting and challenging 
nonincarcerative sentencing options for their cases—from home confinement 
and day fines to a variety of other forms of supervision.21
But the discussions went deeper. They created an atmosphere of collegial 
inquiry, of shared purpose and joint responsibility—for the issues and for each 
participant. The formal sessions and collective meals fomented a kind of social 
and intellectual camaraderie and friendship. Inevitably, students shared with 
the judges aspects of their professional and personal lives, and the judges 
(perhaps in a more guarded fashion) reciprocated. In such an intimate setting, 
outside the hierarchical atmosphere of the courtroom, professional exchange 
can be seasoned with personal disclosure. During a discussion of mandatory 
minimum sentences for drug offenders, for example, a student announced 
that her sister was about to be released from a state prison at the end of a 
five-year sentence for dealing drugs. And one student insisted that prisoners 
know about and adapt their behavior to state sentencing grids and policies—
and he was sure of his facts because he had twice served prison sentences in 
Minnesota before being scared straight in a Georgia lock-up waiting for another 
sentence. On these occasions, when the usually unmentioned personal worlds 
of Workshop participants overtly intruded upon the discussions, the large 
role that sentencers’ backgrounds and values play in their sentences became 
obvious. In addition, in such circumstances, the judges found it difficult to 
avoid feeling a kind of avuncular responsibility for the students’ education 
and long-term professional development. Thus, the social relationships the 
Workshop developed were vital to their method and their success. 
But intimacy and free exchange are only the conditions precedent for the 
kind of education the Sentencing Workshop sought—to challenge judicial 
belief systems. I have come to believe that as sentencers, judges develop a 
20. See infra pp. 18-20.
21. Consider a case reported by a Missouri judge at the first Minnesota Workshop session. A 
recommendation was made that a retired and pensioned 78-year-old child molester, almost 
certainly addicted to the powerful painkillers he was taking for a broken neck, probably 
an alcoholic, and possibly suffering from a brain disorder, be sentenced to share his home 
with a community—or defendant-financed—permanent companion rather than to the two 
consecutive 15-year prison terms the sentencing judge had actually chosen. The rationale 
was that the alternative sentence would save the community the substantial cost of the 
defendant’s stay in prison and provide just as much safety for neighborhood children.
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set of myths that provide cover for their professional selves. To understand a 
judge’s sentencing decisions, then, students have to notice and appreciate the 
roles played by these myths; to facilitate reconsideration of their sentencing 
behaviors, judges have to be encouraged, even coaxed, to articulate the myths 
and to free themselves from their power.
Initially, judges have to understand that judicial unanimity about how 
to sentence any defendant, whatever the crime, is a fantasy. Awareness of 
their fundamental correctional policy disagreements came as a surprise 
and a disappointment to many of the judges. They were always noticeably 
relieved when the box score showed their sentences to have been the same 
or similar. One judge produced his own box score, insisting that there was 
actually more judicial agreement about sentences than the student-produced 
box score showed. And one of the judges from Missouri refused initially to 
sentence any defendant sentenced by his colleagues because, as he wrote to 
me, “I am not an appellate court; I do not exercise reviewing power over my 
colleagues.”22 The atmosphere of the Workshop helped judges acknowledge 
the very diverse sentencing world in which they operate—an essential first step 
toward voluntarily setting aside their other professional defenses.23 
One of the judges’ most powerful myths is shared by citizens generally—
that only a prison sentence qualifies as punishment; probation, no matter 
what its nature or concomitants, does not. As Professor Kahan put the matter, 
“Imprisonment is the punishment of choice in American jurisdictions.”24 It may 
well be that widespread understanding and use by judges of “intermediate” or 
22. The quotation is from a note sent to me as a substitute for the judge’s sentences for the first 
session.
23. In the Workshop’s first year, the casebooks sent to the judges contained their sentences as 
well as the other information about each case. Thereafter, because the tendency reported 
in the text became obvious, the casebook version of the cases blocked out any mention of 
the actual sentence. The judges’ sentences of other judges’ cases became considerably less 
uniform. 
24. Kahan, supra note 16, at 591. See also Norval Morris & Michael Tonry, Between Prison and 
Probation: Intermediate Punishments in a Rational Sentencing Scheme 3-5 (1990): “At 
present, too many criminals are in prison and too few the subjects of enforced controls 
in the community. . . . [Commonly discussion] assumes that the norm of punishment is 
imprisonment. . . . This is true neither historically nor in current practice. Most felonies are 
not now punished by imprisonment. Prison may be the norm of punishment in the minds 
of some citizens, but it is not to those acquainted with the operation of our criminal justice 
systems. . . .” The authors remind readers that the term “alternatives” “gives false promise 
of reducing the present overcrowding in American prisons and jails,” because “currently” 
intermediate punishments tend to be imposed on offenders who would otherwise be given 
a probationary or a suspended sentence rather than those who would otherwise go to jail 
or prison. Id. at 4. Kevin Reitz, Michael Tonry and the Structure of Sentencing Laws, 86 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 1585, 1595 (1996), detected “a world-weary tone [in one of Tonry’s 
later books] in recognition that intermediate punishments have not been taking the country 
by storm,” and attributed the change to recognition that the occasional “highly touted 
programs” have been “drops in the bucket rather than sea changes,” and that the “most 
visible proof of the failure of the intermediate sanctions movement to date is the unabated 
velocity of the growth of American prisons.”
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“alternative” punishment correctional policies will eventually dispel this myth. 
The fact that Workshop discussions focused so narrowly and intensely on each 
defendant and his or her background and total situation compelled the judges 
to think about each defendant as an individual whose punishment demands 
careful and individualized consideration, no matter how far the offender’s 
behavior may have strayed from community norms. The more a sentencer knows 
about a defendant, the more difficult it becomes to impose any punishment—
especially an automatic prison term. In addition, the judges heard a variety of 
serious proposals for punishment, many of which were limited to significant 
nonincarcerative sanctions. That otherwise reasonable people, experts as well 
as inexperienced students, sincerely believed that an intermediate punishment 
can both effectively and justly replace an incarcerative one in a specific case 
did much to legitimate such punishments. This dynamic influenced sentencers 
during each of the Workshop sessions, helping to dispel the myth that only 
prison produces punishment.25
The most important judicial myth is that judges have no power. To deal with 
the pain of depriving men and women of their freedom and sometimes their 
lives, judges insist that theirs is a world of slot machine criminal justice: Pull 
the lever marked with the crime charged and the sentence will shortly appear 
in the window. Judges’ first reaction to the Workshop was to ask why they 
had been invited; they often insisted that the only key players in sentencing 
are prosecutors and the legislature. In sentencing, the judges claimed, their 
personal warrant is nonexistent, their discretion minimal—until they were 
confronted with indisputable evidence of a more complex reality.
During a session in one of the early years, for example, one of the South 
Carolina judges described a female defendant, a 34-year-old single mother with 
two young children, a high school graduate, “obviously an addict, living on 
welfare and SSI,” charged with conspiracy and distribution of crack cocaine. 
The defendant had spent two days in jail before raising bail. According to 
the judge’s description of the case,26 conspiracy carried a five-year penalty; 
distribution of crack had just been amended to remove the mandatory aspect 
of a 15-year sentence and $25,000 fine. Although the penalty had become 
discretionary, “the amendment still left a prohibition against suspending any 
portion of the sentence imposed,” the judge’s memorandum explained, and 
this provision, the judge believed, “effectively eliminated the possibility of 
probation on these charges.” The penalty for distribution of powder cocaine 
25. See, e.g., the post-Workshop statement made to his colleagues by one of the judges who 
participated in the Workshop’s first year, infra text following note 35. This myth, I believe, 
continues to invigorate partially at least some of the academic support given to the 
“sentencing guidelines movement” because it is thought to be the only way to cabin judicial 
disparity in sentencing. For a short discussion of the situation in the federal courts, see supra 
note 14. 
26. Most of the South Carolina cases contained very little file material. At the time, trial judges in 
that state “rode circuit” and had trouble obtaining files from local court systems. Most of the 
cases considered in the Seminar were based on the trial judge’s memorandum reconstructing 
the facts.
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was the same as for crack without a mandatory minimum. The defendant had 
a minor and inconsequential prior criminal record. The prosecutor dropped 
the conspiracy charge in exchange for a plea to crack distribution. The pre-
sentence investigator (PSI) recommended a probationary sentence with 
drug abuse treatment and intensive supervision. The judge tried to have the 
defendant placed in a treatment facility, but discovered that the beds were 
limited to males. In short, the judge made it clear that he did not want to 
imprison this defendant. The judge deferred sentencing until he was to return 
to the county five months later. By then the defendant “had gotten drug 
treatment and appeared to be dramatically improved.” The prosecutor refused 
to reduce the charge to distribution of powder cocaine so that the judge could 
impose a probationary sentence. Although the judge’s report never specifically 
criticized the prosecutor’s intransigence, he reported that he had sentenced 
the defendant to only the two days she had served when first arrested.27
Two hours later, when we began to discuss judges’ power to persuade 
prosecutors to accept what appears to them to be a proper sentence in a 
specific case, the South Carolina judge, like the others, had no clue! The 
judge was simply unwilling to understand, or perhaps only to acknowledge 
to us, that he had deliberately and successfully undermined the prosecutor’s 
supposed sole authority to determine the parameters of the penalty in this 
case, and that undermining would undoubtedly have an influence on the 
prosecutor’s cooperation with the judge in future prosecutions. Nor did the 
other judges appear to appreciate how the judge-prosecutor power balance 
had been rearranged. It is clear that there is professional as well as personal 
emotional safety in assumed powerlessness—and it takes time and patience, 
diplomatic student and faculty persistence, and the right atmosphere, to break 
through that safety net.28 But when the personal and emotional style of the 
27. It has never been clear to me, no expert on South Carolina sentencing law, why the judge 
could not have given a probationary sentence. The judge did indicate that he made a 
practice of sentencing drug defendants to at least one year in prison because only with 
such a sentence would they be eligible for in-prison treatment programs. For the Seminar’s 
purposes, it was not necessary to unravel the legal issue. 
28. On many occasions during Workshop sessions, judges from the same state disagreed about 
the appropriate (or even legal) sentence for a particular defendant. Curiously, some of the 
judges, disagreeing with their colleagues, insisted that they had to follow state legislative 
discretionary sentencing guidelines because otherwise they would be left awash in a sea of 
discretion. Yet one of the colleagues of the judge who made this explicit claim insisted that 
he never consulted the state’s guidelines until he decided in the particular case what a just 
sentence would be. There were many other occasions when seminar discussions indicated 
that at least some judges know that special circumstances demand special sentencing styles. 
In one South Carolina case, the defendant ”streaked” under the stands at a high school 
football game, apparently to attract the attention of the female cheerleaders of the local 
team. The defendant, a mentally disturbed individual who had not taken the medicine 
which usually controlled his otherwise bizarre behavior, was “arrested” by members of the 
local team and held for the police. When the circuit riding judge came to town for the 
sentencing hearing, he was informed that the defendant was taking his medicine regularly 
and that the courtroom was filled with angry parents of the offended cheerleaders. The 
judge reported to the Workshop that he told the clerk to advise the defendant in court that 
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Workshop helps judges to forgo such safety nets, they can and do reexamine 
their community obligations as sentencers from a very different and more 
sophisticated perspective. 
Then there is the myth of sentencing consistency based upon a coherent and 
articulable sentencing philosophy. After some initial collegial loyalty during 
the first Workshop session, the judges began to disagree with, even criticize, 
each other openly. The judges rapidly grasped the students’ sentencing 
predilections and questioned them as to their motives and purposes. The 
students, initially intimidated, learned to reciprocate, making good use of 
clues about the judges’ values and their sentencing inconsistencies to identify 
what participants from one year called personal “hot spots.” During a session 
that year, for example, a Philadelphia judge, defending the lengthy sentence 
he imposed on a defendant with several priors, explained, “I don’t believe 
in second chances.” He awarded probation and every possible break to first 
offenders, he said, but if they appeared before him again, on a new charge or 
a probation violation, he insisted on the maximum. The second session’s cases 
included sentencing by the same judge of a 40-year-old, calculating, articulate, 
and very well dressed professional bank robber. An addict, the defendant 
had a long string of priors but no lengthy sentence because he employed 
notes to tellers rather than a gun and was able, when apprehended, to blame 
confederates. Before the sentencing hearing, the defendant had signed up (but 
had not yet begun) a respected in-patient drug treatment program. The judge 
granted probation for the current offense on condition that the defendant enter 
the treatment program, and waived revocation of probation on the priors. We 
were never exactly sure what judicial “hot spot” this defendant touched. But 
the students’ affectionate description of the judge thereafter as “One Chance 
Charlie” served as a continuing reminder to him and the other judges that 
sentences can be based upon covert, personal, idiosyncrasies.29 
The “hot spots” of individual judges emerged fortuitously because of what 
might be called the “chemistry” or the dynamics of the group. The process was 
stimulated by the facts of the difficult cases, by the judges’ sentences, and by 
the judges’ reactions to the sentences of other participants. The ordering of 
cases within and between sessions also affected the chemistry. The first session 
in the Workshop’s initial year, for example, began with a second degree 
murder case that disrupted the students’ as well as the judges’ platitudes about 
incarceration for violent crime. The defendant was a slight 15-year-old African-
American boy, “mildly mentally retarded” and attending classes in the ninth 
grade. Three older friends and the defendant decided to steal the purse of a 
woman coming out of a diner with her husband. Unfortunately, the boys did 
he was sentenced to probation—and left town before the crowd could confront him.
29. The last case in one of our first sessions involved a sexual abuse charge. As I had expected, 
the students’ sentences were extraordinarily harsh when compared to their sentences of 
other defendants or the judges’ sentences in that case. One of the judges approached me 
privately and said: “You just put that last case in the materials to show that the students’ 
sentences are as subjective and value laden as ours are!” I pleaded guilty. 
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not act until the woman was in the car. One of the boys threw a brick through 
the passenger window, allowing the defendant to grab the woman’s purse. 
Tragically, the brick sent slivers of glass into the woman’s carotid artery, killing 
her. The boys split $20. The defendant was waived for adult prosecution and 
charged with first degree felony murder—a capital offense in Missouri. The 
defendant agreed to plead guilty to second degree murder and the prosecutor 
recommended a minimum 15-year sentence, leaving to the judge the choice 
between incarceration and probation. The defendant had been in jail for more 
than nine months when he was sentenced. Psychological tests conducted for 
the juvenile court transfer proceeding reported:
[T] defendant displayed . . . visual motor skills . . . equivalent to an average 
child aged 10 years and 2 months. Results of personality testing indicated 
that “[defendant] is a rather sad and lonely youth who has difficulty forming 
adequate emotional attachments with other people. . . .
Refusing to grant probation, the judge spoke at length at the penalty 
hearing, the transcript of which became part of the Workshop casebook. He 
commented:
You know, I believe this young man is probably not going to benefit by going 
to jail. I believe that he probably has a better chance of making something of 
himself if I placed him on probation. I believe that. I certainly know that he 
didn’t throw the brick. . . .
You know, the circuit attorney’s office, whose job it is to prosecute these cases, 
they had an option . . . to agree to a lesser time in the plea agreement. They 
could have made it a ten-year minimum, which is minimum for murder second 
and robbery first, and they chose to up the ante from ten to fifteen years. . . .
I believe that the reason the circuit attorney did make that conscious 
decision . . . was they believe [the defendant] is more culpable than perhaps 
you [defendant’s counsel] believe he was. . . .
What you’ve got here is two innocent people who were minding their own 
business and just doing what normal people do, grabbing a bite to eat after 
they were working hard all day trying to make something of their lives. And 
we have four or five youths . . . who just disrupt that entire situation. 
They’ve taken somebody who was a productive citizen . . . and killed her, were 
involved in killing her. . . .
[Y]our attorney can sit here and tell me everything positive about you—and 
one thing he did tell me back in chambers is, hey, Judge, this is the first offense, 
this is the first time this young man’s ever been in any serious trouble. And as 
I told him, you picked one hell of a mistake to make.
If you would have picked a smaller mistake, and I know you don’t pick your 
mistakes, but if your mistake would have been robbing somebody at gunpoint 
and not hurting anyone or taking drugs . . . or stealing a car, or, you know, 
stealing something out of somebody’s house, but the mistake you made is 
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you took another human being and you were involved in causing the death 
of that lady. 
And, you know, I just can’t get past that. And I really have tried and I’ve come 
up with fifteen different ways of trying to get this, you know, to make this 
easier to swallow, but it’s not any easier to swallow for me. . . . These kinds of 
cases just make me hate my job at times. I hate this . . . .
If I put you on probation, I’d feel terrible. If I put you in jail, I’d feel terrible, 
and there’s nothing in between. And there’s nothing I can do here and maybe 
this is not my—it’s not the system’s function to make me feel good when I 
leave this seat and go back in my chambers, but there’s nothing I can do here 
today to make me feel good. 
We did not stop at that initial session to discuss the sentencing judge’s pain; 
nor did we discuss the judge’s failure even to look for some other sentence 
that might punish this defendant commensurately with the loss of life he 
had helped to cause without subjecting him to the extraordinarily grave risks 
to a young and physically vulnerable boy, not to mention the personal and 
social consequences, of 15 years in prison. But the emotional quandary the 
case posed for a sentencer, the judge’s openness about how difficult it was 
for him to make what he saw as a Hobson’s choice and the resonance for the 
other judges of this illustration of their sentencing dilemmas, set a tone for the 
group’s discussions. The judges were compelled to confront rather than ignore 
the choices they make when sentencing, the pain they cause themselves and 
defendants when they impose “just desserts.” It was very difficult thereafter for 
these judges to blind themselves to their awesome responsibility, to the power 
over other people’s lives that responsibility authorizes, or to the personal 
values they inevitably bring to the sentencing endeavor.
The second case that first year was decided by the judge who refused to 
review his colleagues’ sentences. It involved a 22-year-old woman with a $1,100 
a week cocaine addiction. Although she had only completed ninth grade, she 
had managed to become a payroll clerk at a major company, responsible for a 
monthly payroll of more than $400,000. To feed her drug habit, she embezzled 
over $100,000 from the company. But by the time she was sentenced she had 
successfully completed a drug treatment program, held a steady job, was 
engaged to be married and the company had recovered more than half its loss 
from its insurance carrier. A host of neighbors and friends had written letters 
to the judge on her behalf.30 Yet the judge sentenced her to seven years in 
prison and denied her the advantage of an unusual Missouri statutory “shock 
30. This case illustrated two more of the myths sentencing judges live by: character references 
are “a dime a dozen” and of “no consequence”—unless the judge decides to award the light 
sentence they usually recommend, in which case character references are emphasized. 
Similarly, a defendant’s “remorse” is of no consequence because all defendants are taught 
by their lawyers how to present themselves to judges so a judge who decides on a harsh 
sentence need not be constrained by the defendant’s remorse. If the judge wants to impose 
a light sentence, a showing of remorse is emphasized. The game works as well with “absence 
of remorse.”
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probation” statute which would have allowed her to be granted parole after 
120 days. A harsh sentence, certainly, one about which any group of reasonable 
sentencers might well differ, and Workshop participants saw it as the value 
judgment of a colleague entitled to respect but also to honest criticism. The 
sentencing judge could not ignore the variety and contrariety of opinion—
whether or not he allowed it to affect him.31
During the second session, the “refuse to review colleagues” judge was 
again the center of attention—this time for his sentence of three boys from a St. 
Louis suburb, who, just before they graduated high school, had set fire to an 
animal hospital because the owner had fired one of them. The fire killed three 
dogs and caused $325,000 in insured damage to the building. The defendants 
pleaded guilty to arson and burglary. Maximum sentences for the offenses 
charged added up to 38 years.32 Sentencing was postponed at the instance of 
defense lawyers until the boys had graduated from high school, participated in 
a church-sponsored camp for poor children, and matriculated at branches of 
the University of Missouri. The sentencing judge’s view of these defendants 
was sympathetic according to his comments in the sentencing hearing 
transcript:
Today I have to deal with people that I think almost are neighbors even 
though you are from [another suburb of St. Louis]. . . . [T]here is no place 
I have ever lived like [these two suburbs]. There is nothing that hurts more 
than . . . what I am having to do today. Most of the time . . . what I have to do 
just jumps out at me. You don’t get callous up here. I was the attorney for the 
penitentiary system. . . . And I didn’t see anybody down there that I didn’t 
think should be there. It was my job to keep them there.
With only one or two exceptions I enjoyed the job because I thought that’s 
right where they should be. But I have tried to send what I think were my 
quota of people down there that I don’t want to ever meet at [a local mall]. I 
don’t want them ever to meet my wife in [our suburb] or ever want them to see 
31. The other cases for the first session of the first Workshop played on a variety of similar 
themes. They included: a young church worker who took nude pictures of himself with 
the children he was supervising, sentenced to five years in prison; a 25-year-old mother 
of two young children charged with selling two $25 baggies of cocaine to an undercover 
agent, sentenced to five years in prison despite the prosecutor’s agreement not to oppose 
probation, denied “shock probation” because of the asserted importance of discouraging 
the use of drugs in southwestern Missouri; a 32-year-old man, married with two children, 
with six prior felonies but none within the last five years, who had fallen from the sixth floor 
of a building he was helping to paint and suffered multiple fractures all over his body with 
many consequential surgeries since, charged with shooting a friend in the back during an 
unconsummated cocaine deal, sentenced to five years in prison; a 40-year-old woman caught 
transporting marijuana through the county in the back seat of her car, sentenced to two 
years in prison, suspended on condition of 30 days in the local jail. The Missouri judges’ 
sentences for the defendants in these cases were almost as varied as the facts of the set of 
cases chosen for the session.
32. The Minnesota State Public Defender, a frequent visitor at Workshop sessions, put a sharp 
edge on the conversation when he announced that he would have sentenced the boys to 
prison because otherwise he would not have been able to look his own dog in the eye.
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my daughters walking down the street. . . . I am persuaded that you and your 
cohorts aren’t that kind of person. . . .
This is as mean as anything I have ever seen. As senseless as anything I have 
ever seen. I presume by now that you know that. . . .
The judge then suspended imposition of sentence for five years so that the 
defendants, if successful on probation, would have no criminal record, on 
condition that they serve 60 days in county jail (but only on weekends during 
the summer), maintain employment of 30 hours a week during the summers 
and a B average in their college schoolwork, graduate within four-and-a-half 
years, stay out of bars and drink no liquor or beer, maintain a 10:00 p.m. curfew 
and, finally, perform 200 hours of community service at a local animal shelter.
Was the young embezzler’s sentence fair? Or the arsonist’s?33 Are the 
sentences consistent with each other under one or more of the (not necessarily 
consistent) theories justifying criminal punishment? I cannot with any 
assurance answer these questions; indeed, I suspect I could foment a lively 
argument about any of them in any audience. In the collegially confrontational 
atmosphere of the Workshop, though, students, faculty and the judge’s 
colleagues were empowered to ask them—and they were entitled to reject 
what they believed to be superficial answers. The judge could, of course, have 
refused to reexamine his sentences or the moral and social policies underlying 
them but there was no ignoring the choice.34 From such individual lessons, 
delivered in an atmosphere where all participants have agreed to learn from 
each other, delivered in respectful fashion, the judges can acknowledge new 
perspectives.
In my effort to describe the Workshop’s methods I may unintentionally have 
failed to give enough credit to individual judicial participants. Each Workshop 
included judges who had personally led local initiatives to treat addicted 
defendants, judges who were aware that personal values inevitably have an 
impact but that objectivity and decency in sentencing can be achieved. On one 
occasion, for example, a former juvenile court judge held forth at some length 
and with discomforting vehemence that a 22-year-old addicted mother should 
33. All five of the other Missouri judges sentenced the defendant to five years probation 
conditioned on 60 days of weekend local jail time. Remember that these sentences were 
imposed by judges who had seen the actual sentence their colleague imposed. See supra 
note 24 and accompanying text. Most of the students and nonjudicial visiting participants 
(including the state public defender—despite his inflammatory opening comment) gave 
similar probationary sentences, with conditioned jail time varying from eight to 120 days. 
One student sentenced the defendant to prison for two years, to be served on holidays and 
weekends.
34. The discussion of the arson case was somewhat intense as it involved what some perceived as 
racial and gender sentencing differentials. At the end, though, the judge, a fine advocate if 
mischievous, wondered aloud how Workshop participants would have sentenced the arsonist 
if they had known he was Hispanic. Although the students knew that the defendant’s name 
was some equivalent of “Brockingham Smythe,” a name no person in the room would have 
identified as Hispanic, they were speechless. The judge’s assertion was neither challenged 
nor clarified.
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have had parental rights to her other children terminated because she failed 
to obtain medical help for a six-month old daughter who had been severely 
beaten by her boyfriend. One of the other judges commented, “Whenever I 
suspect that I’m angry, I go home and put off sentencing for another day.” The 
sermon was quiet, somewhat indirect, assigning neither blame nor shame; it 
was difficult to ignore but easy to follow.
To summarize: The Sentencing Workshop sought to educate law students 
about sentencing and judging. Simultaneously, it gave trial judges an 
opportunity to explore their sentencing practices and policies. They collectively 
examined their own cases in enough detail that the underlying personal and 
emotional issues were sure to emerge. The surroundings allowed judges to 
be honest with each other and know that whatever criticism their sentences 
attracted was intended to be constructive. The criticism came from their peers, 
from a faculty they had come to trust as helpful, and from inexperienced 
students whose innocence excused their direct and bold style. Finally, the 
learning was personal, very emotional, anecdotal as well as intellectual, and 
without undue or embarrassing personal exposure. Such circumstances are 
ideal for reassessments of any kind. The Workshop made no effort to seek or 
impose conversions and no one’s basic values changed. Rather, the Workshop 
sustained a friendly, tolerant, democratic exchange over a lengthy period 
about matters that are vital to lawyers and to citizens generally. Each of the 
participants learned important lessons from the others about different ways 
of seeing the world and some of its inhabitants; many of the participants were 
influenced to interpret the world more tolerantly as a consequence of the 
exchange.
IV
And now, finally, a look at the “bottom line.” Reconsider the Crocker case 
for a moment. Obviously, the Workshop did nothing to help that defendant. 
But there are thousands of Crockers caught in our criminal justice system, 
sad, poor, uneducated, benighted, beleaguered, addicted, alcoholic, lacking 
self-control, confused, manipulative, even dangerous individuals. Even if we 
could afford the prison space our punitive instincts and our popular culture 
urge us to make available—and we know that we can’t—prison time won’t solve 
our need for community safety from criminal depredation. Cases like Crocker 
should teach us to look for other and more decent punishments to deal with 
at least some crime and some criminals. Judges in our Workshop who looked 
at the system saw that. 
And what of the judge who sentenced Crocker? Did a “hanging” judge 
have an epiphany, become wedded to treatment rather than incarceration? 
No hanging judge—and no epiphany. But after the Workshop the same 
judge sentenced an addicted 22-year-old mother after she pleaded guilty to 
aggravated battery. Prior to sentencing, the case had the benefit of a client-
specific plan and a lengthy group discussion during the Workshop. The judge 
followed the planner’s recommendation and ordered the defendant, with her 
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consent and that of the program, to spend a lengthy period at Delancey Street, 
a famed self-help and participant-run drug treatment program with a branch 
in North Carolina.35
In addition, consider the following:
Item: One of the South Carolina judges, asked by his colleagues if the 
Workshop was useful, answered: “I know that in general our society believes 
that jail is always punishment; as a result of my time in Minnesota, I always ask 
myself whether punishment always has to be jail.”
Item: After the program’s first year, a very conservative judicial participant 
from southwestern Missouri told an assistant state corrections commissioner 
in my presence (and here I am quoting my own report of the incident to the 
Edna McConnell Clark Foundation):
It was not until a month or so [after the last Workshop session] that I realized 
it was the most important experience I have had as a judge, and the most 
useful one.
It was definitely the students who make the difference. . . . It was especially 
uncomfortable when one of my cases was to be discussed. It was especially 
bad for me because in my court and in my home what I say is the law. . . . 
There I had to justify everything or change my mind. It was a difficult but 
important experience for me.
I’m going to meet with [the state’s chief justice] and tell him to put his money 
where his mouth is—if he wants us to use alternative sentences, he damn well 
better make the resources available to us. I’ve now used Mineral Areas [a 
drug treatment program] four times since April, and I never even knew of its 
existence before I came to Minnesota.
And the judge’s assigned probation officer told the officer’s corrections 
department supervisor that something extraordinary must have happened 
because the judge had used his discretionary power to impose “shock 
probation” more in the four months after the last session of the Workshop 
than he had in his previous 11 years on the bench.
Item: One of the judges who attended the Workshop, who on his own 
and with no funding, initiated a local treatment program and a variety of 
alternatives to prison, wrote:
35. It is true that the judge found it necessary to tell local reporters that he was to be informed, 
“no matter where I am in the [s]tate,” if the defendant were to leave or be dismissed from 
the Delancey Street program. Moreover, “the judge admitted he was ‘a little hesitant’ about 
using the alternative sentence, reportedly the first of its kind in the state, but he said he was 
willing to take a chance. ‘I decided to take a one-time, take-a-look approach to this program,’ 
he said at a special sentencing hearing. . . . [The judge] said he wouldn’t have touched it if 
Delancey Street’s approach to alternative sentencing was a ‘feel good, touchy-feely program.’ 
He said his investigation found it ‘a tough program that demands full cooperation.’” Even 
judges occasionally have to give their pronouncements favorable “spin.”
301Teaching Law Students, Judges, and the Community
I must confess to a certain level of skepticism at the beginning of the 1996 
Sentencing Workshop. After 21 years of judicial experience, I had an attitude 
of “I’ve seen it all before.”
Having now completed the Minnesota Sentencing Workshop, I must say it is 
equally true that I have never seen anything like it. The Workshop was far and 
away the best educational experience I have known in the area of sentencing, 
and I feel I have gained a great deal personally by participating.
The Oklahoma judges, including myself, have experienced a kind of bonding 
with each other as a result of the Workshop.
Item: And here is a fairly typical response by one of the Workshop students:
This seminar will always be one of the most significant and impactful 
experiences of my life.
(Even if you discount, as I do, evaluations delivered non-anonymously and 
before grades are assigned, this has to be considered a positive judgment!)
The workshop was fun and educational for students and they rated it highly; 
it received testimonials from judicial participants. But did the Workshop do 
any good? And was it worth the cost? Fair questions. One Workshop visitor 
drew up a plan for an empirical study to determine how judge-participants’ 
sentencing behavior changed after the Workshop and to assess whether, over 
time, sentences to prison have decreased in the states whose judges have 
participated. A decent study would probably cost more than the Workshop’s 
budget for a number of years but it should certainly be undertaken. Pending 
contrary findings, however, I will continue to believe that judges are crucial 
actors in a criminal justice system paralyzed by political fear and public 
ignorance and unable to obtain legislative solutions to an impending 
correctional and social disaster. As sentencers in individual cases, judges can 
help to lessen the adverse consequences. As respected opinion leaders in their 
own communities and, collectively, as a powerful political force in their states, 
judges can help to cure the paralysis. Judges certainly should help and the 
Workshop motivates them to do so.
A personal aside: I was told that the very considerable time and emotional 
energy I devoted to the Workshop took too great a toll—during the last five 
years I could have made larger contributions to the law school’s scholarly 
output if the Workshop were not part of my teaching load. And if the issue 
must be drawn that narrowly that assessment is certainly correct. But the 
problem is larger than academic politics. Even if criminals are not among the 
citizens most deserving of improved situations, no one who knows what our 
prisons are now like and what they are likely to become should doubt the need 
for all of us to seek reform—for prisoners’ sakes and our own.
